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TEMPORAL AWARENESS IN ATC: LITERATURE REVIEW AND A PROPOSED MODEL
Esa M. Rantanen
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Savoy, IL
Air traffic control (ATC) offers a paradigmatic example of a dynamic multi-task environment, placing both consid-
erable and unique demands on the human controllers’ cognitive faculties. In particular, the notion of temporal
awareness, which is argued here to be fundamental to both controller workload management and task performance,
brings together many of the most central components of human information processing system. The temporal di-
mension of ATC offers thus both a rich task environment for the study of temporal awareness and the associated
cognitive  processes  as  well  as  affords  their  quantitative  measurement  for  modeling  purposes.  This  paper  makes  a
case for focused research of temporal awareness in ATC and presents a framework for development of time-based
controller performance metrics and testing of cognitive models of temporal awareness.
Introduction
Successful control of complex systems implies that
the users have a ‘mental model’ of the system, allow-
ing them to predict its behavior and the consequences
of their inputs to it (e.g., Conant, & Ashby, 1970;
Norman, 1983; Rouse & Morris, 1986). The neces-
sity of prediction in the control of even the simplest
devices or in the performance of the most mundane
everyday tasks is obvious, and bespeaks of the con-
genital role of temporal aspects of mental models in
human behavior and performance (Rosen, 1985).
Time can hence be seen as an integral dimension of
mental models as well as an inherent component and
constraint in nearly every human activity.
Human performance in controlling dynamic systems
has a reasonably long history in psychological and
engineering research (e.g., tracking studies), but time
as a focal point in human performance studies has
only recently gained in importance. It is apparent that
operators do not merely react to information pre-
sented  to  them on panels  and meters,  but  act  on  the
basis of their understanding of the context of the in-
formation and the specific task they are performing
(Hollnagel, 1988). The difficulties humans have in
the control of dynamic situations and systems are
well documented (e.g., Waganaar & Sagaria, 1975;
Wickens & Hollands, 2000) as are the often catastro-
phic consequences of these complications in many
high-risk sectors (De Keyser, 1995). Examples of
such occurrences include air traffic controllers who
‘lose the picture’ of the traffic under their responsi-
bility, pilots who ‘fall behind’ their aircraft, and con-
trol room operators who become overwhelmed by
unanticipated events. Many operator errors can also
be classified as temporal (Decortis, De Keyser, Cac-
ciabue, & Volta, 1991; De Keyser, 1995). Conse-
quently, there are several examples of the benefits of
computer aiding in predicting the future states of the
system in air traffic control (ATC) (Wickens, Mavor,
& McGee, 1997; Wickens, Mavor, Parasuraman, &
McGee, 1998), process control (Woods & Roth,
1988), and aircraft cockpits (Wiener & Curry, 1980).
The intricacies of control of complex and dynamic
systems are particularly well illustrated in the na-
tion’s ATC system. Temporal demands are congeni-
tal to ATC; the task environment is inherently dy-
namic and the work often force-paced, with limited
opportunities to shed tasks at times of increased
workload. The importance of an up-to-date mental
model of the traffic situation to the controller is self-
evident (a.k.a. controllers’ ‘picture’; Mogford, 1997;
Whitfield, & Jackson, 1982), as are the temporal de-
mands of the controllers’ task. Air traffic controllers
typically must keep track of multiple simultaneously
unfolding events in the airspace under their responsi-
bility and juggle several tasks requiring simultaneous
attention and action, often under severe time pres-
sure. The notions of controller mental workload and
SA are furthermore central in the modernization ef-
forts  of  the  National  Airspace  System  (NAS)  in  the
U.S. (Wickens et al., 1998)
In addition to the importance of temporal perform-
ance of air traffic controllers, time offers a useful
domain for research of a multitude of human factors
aspects. In addition to the relevance of time to antici-
patory behavior in control of dynamic systems, time
offers attractive methods for the measurement of
covert mental models. Time has a long history as a
means to investigate cognitive processes, timing data
are relatively easy to obtain under both experimental
and naturalistic conditions, and time is a variable that
is common to the human, the task, and the environ-
ment. Time offers thus a common unit of measure-
ment of human performance in the context of the
task,  and  can  be  used  to  infer  the  goodness  of  the
temporal dimension of the operator’s mental model
of the task or system being controlled.
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In this paper I present a conceptual framework for
study  of  temporal  awareness  as  it  pertains  to  ATC,
detail the parameters of a possible model, and suggest
relationships between the model parameters and be-
tween the model and other cognitive constructs.
Some preliminary results are also offered.
Theoretical Underpinnings of Temporal Awareness
Psychology of time and timing processes have a rela-
tively long history of sustained research. This sub-
stantial body of research can be classified by the re-
gions in the temporal spectrum, into milliseconds to
about 10 s range, seconds to minutes range, and the
circadian range of 23 to 25 hours (Collyer & Church,
1998). Other distinctions between studies can be
made based on whether they concern time estimation
or production of temporal intervals. Time estimation
studies can further be divided into those investigating
retrospective timing and those examining prospective
timing. Finally, a number of relatively recent studies
have recognized the role of timing in control of com-
plex systems and ergonomics research (Carmichael,
1997; De Keyser, 1995; Decortis et al., 1991; Holl-
nagel, 2002; Sougné et al., 1993). However, much of
the existing timing literature is only remotely relevant
to the problem at hand. The temporal region associ-
ated with air traffic controllers’ tasks ranges from
seconds to several minutes, making research on
rhythmic behavior (in the milliseconds range) inap-
plicable. Similarly, controllers primarily rely on two-
dimensional cues of the spatial relationships of the
aircraft under their responsibility, available from their
plan view displays, as well as other, more abstract
and often numerical information. Hence, time-to-
contact research (Gibson, 1966; Lee, 1974) is outside
of the scope of this problem as well.
Literature relevant to the present topic can be found
in the literature on theories and models of timing
based on cognitive processes, particularly those of at-
tention and memory (Zakay, Block, & Tsal, 1999),
and the literature on prospective memory. It has been
demonstrated that cognitive processing indeed affects
judgment of durations, consistent with assumptions
that visual stimuli are analyzed by visual information
processor and a timer, and that attention must be
shared with these processors (Thomas & Weaver,
1975). In a contextual model of temporal cognition
(Block, 1989) the cognitive context in the timing pe-
riod contains environmental variations, cognitive
strategies, and emotional states. The crux of this as
well as an alternative segmentation model (Poynter,
1989) is that duration judgment depends on what else
is being processed during the estimation interval,
processing of nontemporal information lengthening
retrospective duration estimates. Many models of
prospective timing, too, assume that temporal infor-
mation is processed explicitly (e.g., Zakay, 1989) and
that this processing requires attentional resources
(Michon & Jackson, 1984).
The attentional gate model (Zakay & Block, 1995;
Zakay et al., 1999) posits a pacemaker, pulsing at a
rate influenced by both environmental and stimulus-
specific factors, and an attentional gate that is opened
allowing the pulse stream enter a cognitive counter.
Attention to time opens the gate further, allowing
more  pulses  pass  to  the  counter  and  shortening  the
duration to be estimated. Conditions for allocation of
attention to time can also be described (Zakay, 1992).
Explicit attention to time increases when temporal
relevance is high and when temporal uncertainty is
low. Combinations of these determinants produce dif-
ferent levels of temporal awareness and affect the du-
ration estimation performance (Zakay, 1992; Zakay
et al., 1999). The model is able to explain many em-
pirically observed phenomena and it provides a de-
scription of the nature of attending to time related to
other cognitive phenomena. Perhaps the most intrigu-
ing aspect of temporal cognition emerges in dual-task
conditions. Concurrent non-temporal tasks have been
shown to have very specific and predictable effect on
temporal secondary tasks, lengthening temporal pro-
duction and shortening temporal reproductions
(Brown, 1997) but the temporal tasks had little or no
effect on the non-temporal tasks in the same experi-
ment. This asymmetric interference has some very
important implications, as will be discussed below.
De Keyser (1990) identified two kinds of temporal
envelopes in a start-up process of an electric power
plant: Temporal intervals associated with relatively
stable and known states of the process, which al-
lowed the operator attend the transitions and changes
of state, and temporal patterns. Rhythmic operation
of a simulated nuclear power plant has also been ob-
served (Okada, 1992). Rhythmic operation implied
an open-loop control mode using accurate and well-
developed mental model and resulted in reduced con-
trol error and operator workload, enhancing overall
performance. Grosjean and Terrier (1999) defined
temporal awareness as a ‘representation of the situa-
tion including the recent past and the near future,” (p.
1443) echoing definitions of mental models and
situation awareness (SA; e.g., Endsley, 1995). In an
experiment on simulated production lines Grosjean
and Terrier (1999) discovered that subjects who had
developed good temporal awareness made fewer er-
rors, prioritized their work more effectively, and
managed their rest periods better than those with
poorer temporal awareness.
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Many operator errors can also be classified as tempo-
ral (De Keyser, 1995; Decortis et al., 1991). Such er-
rors include mis-estimation of sequences of actions
and event, mis-estimation of duration of events with
precise boundaries, failures to estimate the right mo-
ment to take action, failures to anticipate events, and
failure to synchronize collective actions. The com-
monly used class of errors, errors of omission, can
also be divided into subcategories based on time.  In
addition to a true omission (i.e., a missing action), the
action may be delayed or too early (Hollnagel, 1998).
The asymmetric interference effect of dual temporal
and nontemporal tasks (Brown, 1997) and the close
coupling of temporal cognition, memory, and atten-
tion (e.g., Zakay, 1992) seem to make a prospective
duration estimation an ideal secondary task for work-
load measurement. Prospective duration estimation is
a natural secondary task in many instances and sensi-
tive to the demands of perceptual discrimination, per-
ceptual-motor coordination, visual and spatial proc-
essing, mental rotation, visual search, memory
search, and problem-solving, to mention just a few
(Brown, 1997). Several researchers have advocated
the use of time estimation or time production as an
appropriate secondary task measure of workload
(e.g., Hart, 1975). The relationship between workload
and time estimation may also work in the other direc-
tion: Increasing nontemporal workload may affect
performance in time-critical aspects of the task and
result in timing errors.
Many of the aforementioned theories are closely re-
lated with the concept of executive control, first in-
troduced by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) in their
Model of Working Memory (Baddeley, 1990;
Richardson, 1996). Baddeley’s central executive is
often compared to the supervisory attentional system
(SAS) described by Norman and Shallice (1980),
which is a limited capacity system used for a variety
of purposes, including tasks involving planning or
decision making, trouble-shooting in situations in
which automatic processes may run into difficulty,
novel situations, and technically difficult situations
where strong habitual responses or temptations are
involved. The above list is a nearly complete descrip-
tion of air traffic controllers’ tasks. Furthermore,
models of executive control and the basic mecha-
nisms of executive function are often evaluated
through tasks that employ executive resources and
require a complex task set: that have been identified
as ‘executive’ or as tasks that rely on processes that
are considered governed by executive control, such
task switching (e.g., Della Sala et al., 1995) and go/
no-go tasks. The relevance of these tasks to ATC is
again apparent.
Temporal Awareness in ATC
Temporal awareness in ATC may be hypothesized to
be a ‘product’ of several parallel processes: an inter-
nal ‘clock’ or some timekeeping mechanism (cf. Za-
kay et al., 1999), and the attentional and perceptual
processes that sample the external environment (cf.,
the perceptual cycle of Neisser, 1976). It may be fur-
ther hypothesized that human sampling behavior de-
pends on three distinct aspects of temporal aware-
ness: (1) correct time to act on a task or update tem-
poral awareness from cues available in the environ-
ment, (2) awareness of the time available for action
or checking of cues, and (3) awareness of the time
required to perform action or check cues. Temporal
awareness might also contain ‘quality’ information;
for example, ‘losing the track of time’ or suspicion
that the internal model cannot be trusted would
prompt a person to seek to check or update it by look-
ing up some external cues (e.g., check relative posi-
tions of aircraft on a plan view display). Controllers
may thus be assumed to maintain a mental ‘to-do’
list, in which tasks are in a specific order and associ-
ated with temporal windows of opportunity within
which they must be completed.
An illustration will be helpful for grasping the ration-
ale of the above hypotheses: Imagine a controller
working traffic in his/her sector; scanning at the
evolving situation on the plan view display (PVD),
the controller constructs a mental ‘laundry list’ of
events in the future he/she must do something about.
This list might look something like this: ‘...ok, hand
this one over to center, watch this one pass the oppo-
site traffic and then climb him to [altitude], turn that
one on a heading behind the traffic, call center to tell
them to reduce the speed of the inbound...’ and so on.
This is an endless list, with new items continually
added to it and completed items ‘checked off’ and
forgotten. Now, it is clear from this example that the
items in the ‘to-do’ list are in a specific order and that
each has a certain temporal ‘window of opportunity’
(WO) to be completed. The question is then just how
does the controller manage the list. It might be hy-
pothesized that he/she does a fair job remembering
the items, but does not rely on memory about their
correct timing or even sequence, which may be too
difficult to estimate with sufficient accuracy in the
first  place.  For  timing,  then,  the  controller  must  fre-
quently update his or her mental model by visually
scanning the PVD for external cues for the right time
and sequence to act, as well as to add and drop items
in the list.
Effective time management in terms of appropriate
prioritization, sequencing, and timing of tasks is
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therefore a critically important skill to meet the de-
mands of the job and paramount to the successful
completion of the requisite tasks (Loft, Sanderson,
Neal, & Mooij, in press). Task prioritization serves
also another, no less important, function in keeping
the controller’s task load and resultant workload at
safe levels. Effective time management and task pri-
oritization in turn plausibly depend on awareness of
temporal task characteristics and constraints as well
as controllers’ own performance, which may be re-
garded as a special case of SA. Task prioritization, in
turn, is driven by ‘awareness of time available to per-
form tasks, anticipation of future difficulties, and the
[controller’s] knowledge of his or her capacity’ (Loft,
Sanderson, Neal, & Mooij, in press).
It may be further hypothesized that controllers may
heavily depend on external cues and that such cues
indeed dominate their attention allocation and timing
and scheduling of tasks. Nevertheless, understanding
the role and functionality of a temporal awareness is
important, for in the absence of external cues or
alarms the temporal awareness is all the controller
has to make judgments and decisions on. Even if ex-
ternal cues are available, they carry too high informa-
tion access cost for a given situation (e.g., waiting for
several target position updates to accurately estimate
its speed or trajectory) and the controller must make a
‘snap’ decision based on his/her mental model. Un-
derstanding the extent to which controllers rely in
their temporal awareness cum external cues, as well
as the fallibilities and biases of their temporal aware-
ness sans external cues will help in modeling and
predicting controller performance.
Performance implications
The question then is whether failures of temporal
awareness follow any predictable patterns, whether
they are triggered by particular events or conditions
(e.g., task disruptions, workload, etc.), and how such
failures (i.e., losing a picture) might be manifested.
The Contextual Control Model (COCOM) developed
by Hollnagel (1993, 1998) identifies several parame-
ters that may yield useful and practical measures of
operator performance. This model distinguishes four
control modes, scrambled, opportunistic, tactical, and
strategic. In the scrambled mode, human performance
is haphazard and unpredictable, without planning,
and can be best described as a state of momentary
panic, representing a complete loss of SA. The op-
portunistic mode is only slightly better in terms of
performance or SA; the operator merely responds to
the most salient events (e.g., alarms) but is not able to
plan actions or predict their consequences. The tacti-
cal control mode involves planning and the operator
is in control of the situation or the system, implying a
moderately good SA. Finally, in strategic control
mode the operator is in complete control of the task,
able to consider the global context, and exhibiting
good SA. Human performance in the first two modes
can be characterized as reactive and in the latter two
modes as proactive. Reactive and proactive behavior
may be distinguishable in the timing of actions, offer-
ing a potential means for performance measurement.
A Conceptual Model
Air traffic controllers’ tasks can be depicted in a form
of a timeline (Fig 1) reflecting the dynamic and
forced-pace nature of their work. Placing a number of
individual tasks that the controller must perform as
bars on a moving timeline will show that accurate
and appropriate task prioritization depends on estima-
tion of three temporal task parameters: (1) the time
when the task becomes ‘available’, or the time when
a window of opportunity to perform it opens, (2) the
latest time by which the task must be completed, or
the closing of the window of opportunity, and (3) the
time required to perform the task. Hence, in Figure 1,
we can see that the proper task priority is A, C, B, D,
F, E, and G; because task B takes longer to perform
than the entire window of opportunity for task C, task
C should be done first which still leaves enough time
to do task B before its window closes.
Figure 1. A time line representation of air traffic
controllers’ tasks. The numbers on the timeline depict
minutes and the line itself if ‘flowing’ down with
time; separate tasks to be performed are depicted my
bars right of the line and labeled with capital letters.
It can be seen that task E becomes available at about
8 minutes from now and must be performed before
10.5 minutes from now. Several parameters of tem-
poral awareness may be derived from this figure.
Cognitive Demands of Temporal Awareness
It is clear that forming and maintaining accurate tem-
poral awareness in ATC poses enormous cognitive
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demands on controllers. Viewing temporal awareness
as a continuum, with reactive behavior in the low end
and proactive behavior in the high end, it is reasonable
to assume that controllers typically operate with less
than perfect temporal awareness, or with awareness of
only a subset of the temporal variables associated with
the tasks. Exactly which temporal variables controllers
may be aware of, and how accurately, as well as how
temporal awareness may depend on momentary task
load are important research questions.
Monitoring of tasks and temporal cues to them and
estimation of time available to perform tasks, or the
estimation of windows of opportunity (e.g., aircraft’s
distance to sector boundary or coordination point)
will require attentional resources. These may be
modeled by the SEEV model of Wickens et al. (2003;
see also Schriver & Rantanen, this volume). Mainte-
nance  of  a  mental  ‘laundry-’  or  ‘to-do’  list,  on  the
other hand, will place substantial load on working-
and prospective memory (cf. Baddeley, 1990; Nor-
man & Shallice, 1980; Richardson, 1996). Knowl-
edge of time required to perform tasks draws from
controllers’ mental model of task requirements and
own performance, which may be assumed to reside in
the long-term memory and be subject to knowledge-
based biases and errors (Reason, 1990). Finally, es-
timation of elapsed time during tasks and distractions
will depend on some internal time-keeping mecha-
nism (e.g., Zakay et al. 1999). Hence, temporal
awareness in ATC offers a unique and very rich do-
main  for  research  of  a  multitude  of  cognitive  proc-
esses; conversely, existing  research is readily appli-
cable to modeling of controller performance.
Measurement of Temporal Awareness
From Figure 1, several measures of temporal aware-
ness may be derived, such as the proper prioritization
of tasks and the ‘timeliness’ of performance. In par-
ticular, it may be possible to measure the elapsed time
from opening of a window of opportunity on individ-
ual tasks to an observable action on that task; good
temporal awareness is manifested in timely perform-
ance on tasks, or consistently short ‘time to first ac-
tion’ from the opening of the window. Degradation of
temporal awareness in turn is manifested in increasing
variability in attending of tasks and late performance
(completion of tasks after closing of the window of
opportunity). Figure 2 illustrates these metrics.
Indeed, it has been shown that the time to first action
is a measure that is sensitive to workload (Rantanen
& Levinthal, 2005), which plausibly disrupted the
subjects’ temporal awareness in two multi-task ex-
periments. Similar results were obtained also from
another study, examining controller performance in
high-fidelity simulation; in a total of six different
tasks the timeliness of performance deteriorated as
task load in the simulated scenarios was increased
(Rantanen et  al.,  2006).  It  was  also  shown that  con-
trollers exhibited awareness of the temporal charac-
teristics of their tasks, manifested in strong trend to
perform tasks that had been ‘available’ longer, i.e.,
whose window of opportunity had opened earlier, be-
fore tasks whose window of opportunity had been
opened later, signifying a ‘first come, first served’
approach to task prioritization. This trend persisted as
task load increased. Controllers also had awareness
of the urgency of their tasks, as those with impending
closing of window of opportunity were performed be-
fore tasks that had longer time available before clos-
ing of window of opportunity (Rantanen et al., 2006).
Figure 2. Derivation of measures of temporal aware-
ness from know task demands and observable actions
of the controller. Consistent and timely performance
of tasks indicates good temporal awareness. Key: TA
= Time Available, TFA = Time to First Action, TR =
Time Required, and TRm = Time Remaining.
Conclusion
The results described above emerged from aggrega-
tion of large amounts of data. It is clear that innumer-
able factors are present in each prioritization decision
made by controllers in the line of their work and that
the first come, first served scheme as well as the ap-
parent sense of urgency observed in the above results
were only two possible factors among many. How-
ever, the fact that these patterns indeed did emerge
from different experimental tasks and data collected
from realistic and only minimally controlled situation
attests to the strength of temporal factors and the con-
trollers’ awareness of them in task prioritization. It
appears safe to conclude that no feasible model of
controller temporal awareness could possibly con-
sider all factors present in each prioritization decision
or individual differences among the decision-makers
to make accurate case-by-case predictions of task
prioritization. However, consideration of the tempo-
ral task characteristics in prioritization algorithms
could very well produce realistic aggregate level pre-
dictions of controller performance.
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